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Abstract. In this paper we present Hilbert-style axiomatizations for three log-
ics for reasoning about continuous-space Markov processes (MPs): (i) a logic for
MPs defined for probability distributions on measurable state spaces, (ii) a logic
for MPs defined for sub-probability distributions and (iii) a logic defined for ar-
bitrary distributions. These logics are not compact so one needs infinitary rules in
order to obtain strong completeness results.
We propose a new infinitary rule that replaces the so-called Countable Additivity
Rule (CAR) currently used in the literature to address the problem of proving
strong completeness for these and similar logics. Unlike the CAR, our rule has
a countable set of instances; consequently it allows us to apply the Rasiowa-
Sikorski lemma for establishing strong completeness. Our proof method is novel
and it can be used for other logics as well.
1 Introduction
Markov processes (MPs) are standard models used for abstracting and reasoning about
complex natural and man-made systems in order to handle either a lack of knowledge or
inherent randomness. There are various levels of abstraction that one can consider in the
definition of Markov processes: (i) the state space can be modeled by using particular
types of structures that can vary from discrete finite spaces to topological or measurable
spaces; (ii) the indeterminacy can be modeled by using probability or sub-probability
distributions over the state space to describe the probability of transitions or by as-
suming exponentially distributed random variables to characterize the time durations
between transitions.
To specify properties of Markov processes, the natural logic is a simple modal logic
in which bounds on probabilities enter into the modalities. This logic can be stripped
down to a very spartan core —just the modalities and finite conjunction— and still
characterize bisimulation for labeled Markov processes [5, 6]. It is therefore tempting to
understand this logic from a proof theoretic perspective. Recent papers [4, 11, 19] have
established complete proof systems and prove finite model properties for similar logics.
Goldblatt in [11] presents a proof-theoretic analysis of the logic of T -coalgebras, where
T is any polynomial functor constructed from a standard monad on the category of mea-
surable spaces. He proves that the semantic consequence relation over T -coalgebras is
equal to the least deducibility relation that satisfies Lindenbaum’s lemma, which states
that any consistent set of formulas can be extended to a maximally consistent set. In
other words, this consequence relation is equal to the least of all deducibility relations
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if and only if that least deducibility relation satisfies Lindenbaum’s lemma. These logics
are not compact and for proving the aforementioned results in [11] it is used a powerful
infinitary axiom scheme named the Countable Additivity Rule (CAR). In [21] Zhou and
Ying prove that such a logic is not strongly-complete in the absence of CAR.
A feature of CAR is that it has an uncountable set of instances. This fact makes it
difficult to prove that maximally consistent sets exist for such logics and consequently,
in the papers concerned with the strong completeness of the modal logics for Harsanyi
type spaces [19, 21] or for Markov processes [4, 15] it had to be assumed that consistent
sets can be extended to maximally consistent sets. The completeness theorems cited are
contingent on this assumption.
In this paper we reconsider the axiomatizations of the deducibility relations for
three modal logics for Markov processes. The first one refers to what we call proba-
bilistic Markov processes (PMPs), which are Markov processes defined by probability
distribution over the state space. The second one is a modal logic for subprobabilis-
tic Markov processes (SMPs), which are Markov processes defined for sub-probability
distributions, and the third one is defined for what we call general Markov processes
(GMPs), which are Markov processes defined for arbitrary distributions, usually these
are interpreted as rates.
We propose a new infinitary axiom schema to replace CAR. Unlike CAR, our axiom
has a countable set of instances. This fact allows us to invoke the Rasiowa-Sikorski
Lemma and prove the strong completeness theorem via a canonical models construction
without needing to assume that consistent sets can be enlarged to maximal consistent
sets (Lindenbaum’s lemma). In fact Lindenbaum’s lemma can be directly proven from
the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma.
The Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma is a model-theoretic result that exploits a topological
result known as Baire category theorem and the Stone duality for boolean algebras with
operators. Applied to logics, the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma states that given a multimodal
logic (possibly involving an infinite set of modalities) for which the provability relation
admits an axiomatization such that the set of instances of the infinitary proof rules (if
any) is countable, then for any consistent formula ϕ, there exists a maximally-consistent
set of formulas containing ϕ. Since we manage to replace CAR with an infinitary rule
having a countable set of instances, we can apply this result and prove strong complete-
ness for each of the three logics.
The contribution of this paper consists in the novelty of the proof method for strong
completeness. We have used already these types of techniques in [13], where we proved
a Stone duality for PMPs. That result implies strong completeness for the logic for
PMPs but the logical aspects were not spelled out in that paper; there we concentrated
on the algebraic versions of the logic and proved a duality theorem. In this paper we
spell out the completeness theorem explicitly and, in addition, demonstrate that, in fact,
the proof method can be used for the other two logics as well. Though these logics are
superficially very similar, the axiomatizations are different and none of the complete-
ness theorems follow directly from the others.
We also show that the infinitary axiom needed to replace CAR can be obtained by
a lifting of the so-called archimedean axioms already present in the old versions of
these axiomatizations. We are confident that similar results can be obtained for the gen-
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eral case of the measurable polynomial functors on the category of measurable spaces
considered in [11], but we do not have such a result yet.
2 Background
Let Q0 = Q ∩ [0, 1], Q+ = Q ∩ [0,∞), R0 = R ∩ [0, 1], and R+ = R ∩ [0,∞).
2.1 Measurable Spaces and Measures
In this section we introduce a few concepts and results from measure theory that we
will find useful. For more details, we refer the reader to [3, 8].
Let M be an arbitrary nonempty set.
A field (of sets) over M is a boolean algebra of subsets of M under the usual set-
theoretic boolean operations. A σ-algebra (also called a σ-field) over M is a field of
sets over M closed under countable union. The tuple (M, Σ) where Σ is a σ-algebra over
M, is called a measurable space and the elements of Σ measurable sets.
If Ω ⊆ 2M , the σ-algebra generated by Ω, denoted σ(Ω), is the smallest σ-algebra
containingΩ. Every topological space has a naturalσ-algebra associated with it, namely
the one generated by the open sets. This is called the Borel algebra of the space, and
the measurable sets are called Borel sets.
Given two measurable spaces (M, Σ) and (N, Ω), a function f : M → N is measur-
able if f −1(T ) ∈ Σ for all T ∈ Ω. We use ~M → N to denote the family of measurable
functions from (M, Σ) to (N, Ω).
A nonnegative real-valued set function µ is finitely additive if µ(A∪B) = µ(A)+µ(B)
whenever A∩B = ∅. We say that µ is countably subadditive if µ(⋃i Ai) ≤ ∑i µ(Ai) for a
countable family of measurable sets, and we say that µ is countably additive if µ(∪iAi) =∑
i µ(Ai) for a countable pairwise-disjoint family of measurable sets. Finite additivity
implies monotonicity and countable additivity implies certain continuity properties; see
the references for precise statements.
Given a measurable space (M, Σ), a countably additive set function µ : Σ → R+ is
a measure on (M, Σ). A measure µ : Σ → R0 is a subprobability measure. Thus, for
a subprobability measure µ(M) ≤ 1; if in addition µ(M) = 1, µ is a probability mea-
sure. We use ∆(M, Σ), Π(M, Σ) and Π∗(M, Σ) to denote the set of measures, probability
measures and subprobability measures on (M, Σ) respectively.
We view ∆(M, Σ) as a measurable space by defining the σ-algebra generated by the
sets {µ ∈ ∆(M, Σ) | µ(S ) ≥ r} for S ∈ Σ and r ∈ R+. This is the least σ-algebra on
∆(M, Σ) such that all maps µ 7→ µ(S ) : ∆(M, Σ)→ R+ for S ∈ Σ are measurable, where
the set of positive reals is endowed with theσ-algebra generated by all rational intervals,
i.e. the Borel σ-algebra. Similarly, Π(M, Σ) and Π∗(M, Σ) can be viewed as measurable
spaces by defining the σ-algebras generated by the sets {µ ∈ Π(M, Σ) | µ(S ) ≥ r} and
{µ ∈ Π∗(M, Σ) | µ(S ) ≥ r} respectively, defined for S ∈ Σ and r ∈ [0, 1].
The next theorem is a key tool in our constructions.
Theorem 1. [Theorem 11.3 of [3]] Let F ⊆ 2M be a field of sets. Let µ : F → R+ be
finitely additive and countably subadditive. Then µ extends uniquely to a measure on
σ(F ).
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2.2 Analytic Spaces
Recall that a topological space is said to be separable if it contains a countable dense
subset and second countable if its topology has a countable base. Second countability
implies separability, but not vice versa; however, the two concepts coincide for metric
spaces. A Polish space is the topological space underlying a complete separable metric
space. An analytic space is a continuous image of a Polish space in a Polish space.
Analytic spaces enjoy remarkable properties that were crucial in proving the logical
characterization of bisimulation [6, 16]. We note that the completeness theorems proved
in [4, 15, 21] were established for Markov processes defined on analytic spaces.
2.3 The Baire Category Theorem
The Baire category theorem is a topological result with important applications in logic.
It is used to prove the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma [17, 10] which is crucial for this paper.
A subset D of a topological space X is dense if its closure D is all of X. Equivalently,
a dense set is one intersecting every nonempty open set. A set N ⊆ X is nowhere dense
if every nonempty open set contains a nonempty open subset disjoint from N. A set is
of the first category or meager if it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets.
A Baire space is one in which the intersection of countably many dense open sets
is dense. It follows from these definitions that the complement of a first category set
is dense in any Baire space. Baire originally proved that the real line is a Baire space.
More generally, every Polish space is Baire and every locally compact Hausdorff space
is Baire. For us, the relevant version is the following special case: every compact Haus-
dorff space is Baire.
Definition 2. Let B be a boolean algebra and let T ⊆ B be such that T has a greatest
lower bound
∧
T in B. An ultrafilter (maximal filter) U is said to respect T if T ⊆ U
implies that
∧
T ∈ U. If T is a family of subsets of B, we say that an ultrafilter U
respects T if it respects every member of T .
Theorem 3 (Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma [17]). For any boolean algebra B and any
countable family T of subsets of B, each member of which has a meet in B, and for
any nonzero x ∈ B, there exists an ultrafilter in B that contains x and respects T .
3 Markov Processes
In this section we introduce three classes of models of probabilistic systems with a
continuous state space: (i) probabilistic Markov processes (PMPs), (ii) subprobabilistic
Markov processes (SMPs) and (iii) general Markov processes (GMPs). The first two
classes contain the systems for which the transition from a state to a measurable set
of states is characterized by its probability. The third class represents the systems with
continuous-time transitions, i.e., the probability of a transition from a state to a measur-
able set of states depends on time. In earlier papers, they were called labeled Markov
processes to emphasize the fact that there were multiple possible actions, but here we
will suppress the labels, as they do not contribute any relevant structure for our results.
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Definition 4 (Markov process). Given an analytic space (M, Σ),
– a probabilistic Markov process is a measurable mapping θ ∈ ~M → Π(M, Σ);
– a subprobabilistic Markov process is a measurable mapping θ ∈ ~M → Π∗(M, Σ);
– a general Markov process is a measurable mapping θ ∈ ~M → ∆(M, Σ).
In what follows we identify a Markov process with the tupleM = (M, Σ, θ); M is
called the support set, denoted by supp(M), and θ is called the transition function.
IfM = (M, Σ, θ) is a (probabilistic/subprobabilistic/general) Markov process, then
for m ∈ M, θ(m) is a (probabilistic/subprobabilistic/general) measure on the state space
(M, Σ). IfM is a PMP or a SMP, the value θ(m)(N) for N ∈ Σ represents the probability
of a transition from m to a state in N; otherwise, ifM is a GMP, then θ(m) is a measure
on the state space and the value θ(m)(N) ∈ R+ represents the rate of an exponentially
distributed random variable that characterizes the transition from m to a state in N.
The condition that θ is measurable is equivalent to the condition that for fixed N ∈ Σ,
the function m 7→ θ(m)(N) is measurable (see e.g. Proposition 2.9 of [7]).
4 Markovian Logics
Markovian logics are multi-modal logics for semantics based on the three classes of
Markov processes introduced in the previous section. They have been introduced and
studied in various contexts [1, 2, 14, 12, 19, 9, 4, 15]. In addition to the boolean opera-
tors, these logics are equipped with modal operators of type Lr for rational numbers
r that are used to approximate the numerical labels of the transitions. Intuitively, the
formula Lrϕ is satisfied by m ∈ M whenever the probability/rate of a transition from m
to a state satisfying the logical property ϕ is at least r.
In this paper we study three Markovian logics: the probabilistic Markovian logic
(PML), the subprobabilistic Markovian logic (SML) and the general Markovian logic
(GML); they are interpreted on PMPs, SMPs and GMPs respectively. Despite their
apparent similarities, we have found it necessary to treat these logics separately because
of subtle technical differences that make a uniform treatment difficult.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics
Definition 5. Given a countable set P of atomic propositions, the grammars below
define the sets of formulas L(Π) of probabilistic and subprobabilistic Markovian logic
and L(∆) of general Markovian logic
L(Π) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Lrϕ, for arbitrary p ∈ P and r ∈ Q0
L(∆) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Lrϕ, for arbitrary p ∈ P and r ∈ Q+
For each of these logics we assume that the usual boolean operators >,⊥,∨,→ are
available as derived constructs as well as the additional derived operator
Lr1···rnϕ = Lr1 · · · Lrnϕ
defined for r1, . . . , rn ∈ Q0 for L(Π) and for r1, . . . , rn ∈ R+ for L(∆).
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To differentiate the probabilistic and the subprobabilistic logics, which have the
same syntax but different semantics, we denote in what follows by L(Π∗) the logic
interpreted on subprobabilistic distributions and we use L(Π) to refer to the logic inter-
preted on probabilistic distributions.
In what follows we define en masse the semantics for three logics using a generic L
that ranges over the set {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)}. However, each of the following concepts
has to be properly interpreted in each case. Let M = (M, Σ, θ) be a PMP when we
consider L = L(Π), an SMP when we consider L = L(Π∗) and an GMP when we
consider L = L(∆). Let m ∈ M be an arbitrary state and i : M → 2P an arbitrary
interpretation function for the atomic propositions. The semantics of the three logics is
defined as follows.
– M,m, i  p iff p ∈ i(m),
– M,m, i  ϕ ∧ ψ iffM,m, i  ϕ andM,m, i  ψ,
– M,m, i  ¬ϕ iff notM,m, i  ϕ.
– M,m, i  Lrϕ iff θ(m)(~ϕiM) ≥ r,
where ~ϕiM = {m ∈ M | M,m, i  ϕ}.
For the last clause to make sense, ~ϕiM must be measurable. This is guaranteed, for
each of the three types of Markov process, by the fact that θ is a measurable map-
ping between the measurable space of states and the measurable space of probabilis-
tic/subprobabilistic/general distributions (see e.g. [4] for a complete proof).
GivenM = (M, Σ, θ) and i, we say that m ∈ M satisfies ϕ ifM,m, i  ϕ. We write
M,m, i 6 ϕ if it is not the case thatM,m, i  ϕ; and we writeM,m, i  Φ ifM,m, i  ϕ
for all ϕ ∈ Φ. We write Φ  ϕ if M,m, i  ϕ whenever M,m, i  Φ. A formula or
set of formulas is satisfiable if there exist an MPM, an interpretation function i forM
and m ∈ supp(M) that satisfies it. We say that ϕ is valid and write  ϕ, if ¬ϕ is not
satisfiable.
In what follows, when we have to differentiate between the three semantics, we will
use indexes: Π will be used for PML, Π∗ for SML and ∆ for GML.
4.2 Hilbert-style Axiomatizations
We now present Hilbert-style axiomatic systems for the three logics. These axiomatic
systems are meant to include the axioms of propositional logic; we do not write propo-
sitional axioms explicitly. In the next section we prove that these system are strongly
complete for their semantics, meaning that an arbitrary formula ϕ can be proven from
an arbitrary set Φ of formulae if and only if the models of Φ are also models of ϕ.
As we did for the semantics, we introduce the concepts related to the provability
en masse. However, they have a specific meaning for each logic and depend directly of
each particular provability relation.
As usual, for an arbitrary formula ϕ, ` ϕ denotes the fact that ϕ is an axiom or a
theorem in the system. If Φ is a set of formulas, we write Φ ` ϕ and say that Φ derives
ϕ if ϕ is provable from the axioms and the extra assumptions Φ; we implicitly assume
that the provability relation is adapted for the infinitary proofs allowed by the axiomatic
systems. A formula or set of formulas is consistent if it cannot derive ⊥. We say that Φ
is maximally consistent if it is consistent and it has no proper consistent extensions.
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When we have to differentiate between the three provability relations, we will use
indexes: `Π will be used for PML, `Π∗ for SML and `∆ for GML.
The axiomatic system of PML is listed in Table 1. The axioms and the rules are
stated for arbitrary ϕ, ψ ∈ L and arbitrary r, s, r1, .., rk ∈ Q0 for k ≥ 0.
(A1): `Π L0ϕ
(A2): `Π Lr>
(A3): `Π Lrϕ→ ¬Ls¬ϕ, r + s > 1
(A4): `Π Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ Lr+sϕ, r + s ≤ 1
(A5): `Π ¬Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬Lr+sϕ, r + s ≤ 1
(R1):
`Π ϕ→ ψ
`Π Lrϕ→ Lrψ
(R2): {Lr1 ···rkrψ | r < s} `Π Lr1 ···rk sψ
Table 1. The axioms of L(Π)
A similar axiomatic system was studied in [19, 20]. The novelty of our axiomati-
zation is the rule (R2). In [19], for proving the strongly completeness of the axiomatic
system, Lindenbaum’s lemma is assumed as a meta-axiom and instead of (R2), the rules
in Table 2 are used, stated for arbitrary ϕ ∈ L(Π) and arbitrary set Φ ⊆ L(Π) closed
under conjunction, where LrΦ = {Lrψ | ψ ∈ Φ}.
(R2’): {Lrψ | r < s} `Π Lsψ
(R2”):
Φ `Π ϕ
LrΦ `Π Lrϕ
Table 2. Zhou’s rules of L(Π)
While (R2’) is an instance of (R2), (R2”) is much stronger and it has an uncountable
set of instances. This makes the proof of the existence of the maximally consistent sets
difficult. In our case that fact that (R2) has countably many instances means that the
existence of maximally consistent sets is guaranteed by the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma.
Before introducing the axiomatization of SML, notice that (A3) guarantees that the
semantics must use distributions bounded by 1 while (A2) guarantees that these are
probability distributions.
The axiomatic system of SML is listed in Table 3. The axioms and the rules are
stated for arbitrary ϕ, ψ ∈ L and arbitrary r, s, r1, .., rk ∈ Q0 for k ≥ 0.
Notice the difference between this system and the previous one. For SML the axiom
(A2) is not sound anymore, since for a subprobability distribution the measure of the
entire space can be smaller than 1. However, (A2’) which replaces (A2) is also sound
for PML.
The axiomatic system of GML is listed in Table 4. The axioms and the rules are
stated for arbitrary ϕ, ψ ∈ L and arbitrary r, s, r1, .., rk ∈ Q+ for k ≥ 0.
8 D. Kozen, R. Mardare, P. Panangaden
(A1): `Π∗ L0ϕ
(A2’): `Π∗ Lr⊥ → ⊥
(A3): `Π∗ Lrϕ→ ¬Ls¬ϕ, r + s > 1
(A4): `Π∗ Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ Lr+sϕ, r + s ≤ 1
(A5): `Π∗ ¬Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬Lr+sϕ, r + s ≤ 1
(R1):
`Π∗ ϕ→ ψ
`Π∗ Lrϕ→ Lrψ
(R2): {Lr1 ···rkrψ | r < s} `Π∗ Lr1 ···rk sψ
Table 3. The axioms of L(Π∗)
(A1): `∆ L0ϕ
(A2’): `∆ Lr⊥ → ⊥
(A4): `∆ Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ Lr+sϕ, r + s ≤ 1
(A5): `∆ ¬Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬Lr+sϕ, r + s ≤ 1
(R1):
`∆ ϕ→ ψ
`∆ Lrϕ→ Lrψ
(R2): {Lr1 ···rkrψ | r < s} `∆ Lr1 ···rk sψ
(R3): {Lr1 ···rkrψ | r ∈ Q+} `∆ Lr1 ···rk⊥
Table 4. The axioms of L(∆)
The difference with respect to the axiomatic system of SML is that the axiom (A3)
is not sound anymore. Moreover, the indexes of the modal operator can be any positive
rational, meaning that these axioms have more instances than the corresponding ones in
the other two systems. Since the semantics does not allow infinite measures, rule (R3)
guarantees that divergent sequences of modalities prefixing some formula generates an
inconsistent set of formulas.
Strong completeness for this logic was proven in [15] where, as in the case of
Zhou’s completeness for PML, Lindenbaum’s lemma is postulated and the rules (R2’)
and (R2”) are involved.
The next theorem states the soundness of the axioms of the three logics for their
corresponding semantics
Theorem 6. [Soundness]
1. The axiomatization of PML is sound for the PMPs semantics, i.e.,
for any ϕ ∈ L(Π), `Π ϕ implies Π ϕ.
2. The axiomatization of SML is sound for the SMPs semantics, i.e.,
for any ϕ ∈ L(Π∗), `Π∗ ϕ implies Π∗ ϕ.
3. The axiomatization of GML is sound for the GMPs semantics, i.e.,
for any ϕ ∈ L(∆), `∆ ϕ implies ∆ ϕ.
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4.3 Canonical Models
In this section we construct canonical models for the three logics. The canonical model
for a logic L ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)} is a Markov processesML = (UL, ΣL, θL) having
the setUL of L-maximally consistent sets of formulas as the state space and satisfying
the property that for any ϕ ∈ L and u ∈ UL, ML, u, iL  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ u, where iL is an
appropriate interpretation function.
In order to complete such a construction, we have to:
– prove thatUL , ∅ for each L ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)};
– define ΣL such that (UL, ΣL) is an analytic space;
– define a measure θL on (UL, ΣL);
– define an interpretation function iL such that for any ϕ ∈ L, ~ϕiLML ∈ ΣL;
– and prove the Truth Lemma stating thatML, u, iL  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ u.
Lemma 7. ForL ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)} with the proof systems previously defined, the
setUL of L-maximally consistent sets is nonempty.
Proof. Note that in each case L forms a boolean algebra and the instances of all the
axioms and rules define a countable family of subsets of L, each member of which has
the meet in L; in particular the instances of (R2) define the subsets {Lr1···rkrψ | r < s} of
L each having the meet Lr1···rk sψ ∈ L. Observe also that a set u ⊆ L is a L-maximally
consistent set iff it is a boolean ultrafilter that respects all the instances of the axioms of
L. Consequently, the Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma guarantees thatUL , ∅.
Let LLM = {LϕM | ϕ ∈ L}, where LϕM = {u ∈ UL | ϕ ∈ u}. Using this, we define ΣL =
σ(LLM). The space (UL, ΣL) is an analytic space for each L ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)}.
The proof for the probabilistic case —which is decidedly non-trivial— can be found
in [13] and works similarly for the other two cases.
The next step in our construction is to define an appropriate measure θL on (UL, ΣL).
To do this we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8. 1. For arbitrary u ∈ UL(Π) and ϕ ∈ L(Π), or u ∈ UL(Π∗) and ϕ ∈ L(Π∗),
xϕu = sup{r ∈ Q0 | Lrϕ ∈ u} = inf{r ∈ Q0 | ¬Lrϕ ∈ u}.
Moreover, if xϕu ∈ Q, then Lxϕuϕ ∈ u.
2. For arbitrary u ∈ UL(∆) and ϕ ∈ L(∆),
xϕu = sup{r ∈ Q+ | Lrϕ ∈ u} = inf{r ∈ Q+ | ¬Lrϕ ∈ u} ∈ R+.
Moreover, if xϕu ∈ Q, then Lxϕuϕ ∈ u.
The previous lemma allows us to define, for each L ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)} and
arbitrary u ∈ UL, ϕ ∈ L,
θL(u)(LϕM) = sup{r ∈ Q+ | Lrϕ ∈ u}.
Obviously, θL(u) is a set function defined on the field LLM and Theorem 1 ensures us that
it can be uniquely extended to a measure on ΣL if it is finitely additive and countable
subadditive on LLM. This is what we prove next.
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Lemma 9. For all u ∈ UL, the function θL(u) is finitely additive.
Now we prove that the function is also countable subadditive and this is a central
result of the paper where we make use of (R2). In related papers, to prove a similar
result a so-called countable additivity axiom was used. This is an infinitary axiom with
uncountable instances [11, 21, 15].
The main technical lemma that lies at the heart of the construction is proved in
our previous paper on Stone duality [13] for the probabilistic case. The proof can be
similarly done for the other two cases.
Lemma 10. For u ∈ UL, the function θL(u) is countably subadditive.
The previous lemmas guarantees that θL can be extended to a measure on (UL, ΣL).
From the construction we also obtain that θL(Π) is a probabilistic measure and θL(Π∗) is
a subprobabilistic measure.
Theorem 11 (Canonical models).
1. ML(Π) = (UL(Π), ΣL(Π)) is a probabilistic Markov process;
2. ML(Π∗) = (UL(Π∗), ΣL(Π∗)) is a subprobabilistic Markov process;
3. ML(∆) = (UL(∆), ΣL(∆)) is a general Markov process.
Proof. In the generic case we only need to verify that θL is a measurable function. Let
ϕ ∈ L, and r ∈ [0, 1] for L(Π) and L(Π∗) and r ∈ R+ for L(∆). Consider (ri)i ⊆ Q
an increasing sequence with supremum r. Let X = {µ ∈ Π(UL(Π), ΣL(Π)) | µ(LϕM) ≥
r} for L(Π), X = {µ ∈ Π∗(UL(Π∗), ΣL(Π∗)) | µ(LϕM) ≥ r} for L(Π∗) and X = {µ ∈
∆(UL(∆), ΣL(∆)) | µ(LϕM) ≥ r} for L(∆). It suffices to prove, in each case, that θ−1L (X) ∈
ΣL. But
θ−1L (X) = {u ∈ UL | θ(u)(LϕM) ≥ r} = ⋂
i
{u ∈ UL | θL(u)(LϕM) ≥ ri} = ⋂
i
LLriϕM ∈ ΣL.
We define an interpretation function iL for arbitrary u ∈ UL by iL(u) = u∩P. Now
we are ready to prove the Truth Lemma.
Lemma 12 (Truth Lemma). For L ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)}, Φ ⊆ L and u ∈ UL,
ML, u, iL  Φ iff Φ ⊆ u.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove inductively that for any ϕ ∈ L,ML, u, iL  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ u.
The case ϕ ∈ P and the boolean cases are trivial.
The case ϕ = Lrψ: (=⇒) Suppose that ML, u, iL  ϕ and ϕ < u. Hence ¬ϕ ∈ u.
Let xϕu = in f {r ∈ Q | ¬Lrψ ∈ u}. Then, from ¬Lrψ ∈ u, we obtain r ≥ xϕu . But
ML, u, iL  Lrψ is equivalent with θL(u)(LψM) ≥ r, i.e. xϕu ≥ r. Hence, xϕu = r ∈ Q and
Lemma 8 implies Lxψuϕ ∈ u, i.e., ϕ ∈ u - contradiction.
(⇐=) If Lrψ ∈ u, then r ≤ xϕu , i.e., r ≤ θL(u)(LψM). Hence,ML, u, iL  Lrψ.
The Truth Lemma allows us to prove strong completeness for all three logics.
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Theorem 13 (Completeness). For L ∈ {L(Π),L(Π∗),L(∆)}, Φ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L
Φ  ϕ iff Φ ` ϕ.
Proof. (⇐=) This is a consequence of soundness, Theorem 6.
(=⇒) If Φ is inconsistent, the statement is trivially true. Suppose that Φ is consistent,
and let u ∈ UL be an arbitrary maximally consistent set. We have that Φ ⊆ u iff
UL, u, iL  Φ (from Truth Lemma). But if UL, u, iL  Φ, since Φ  ϕ, we obtain that
UL, u, iL  ϕ. Applying again the truth lemma we get ϕ ∈ u. Consequently, for an
arbitrary maximally-consistent set u ∈ UL, Φ ⊆ u implies ϕ ∈ u. Hence, Φ ` ϕ.
5 Conclusions and Related Work
The most closely related work to ours is the work of Goldblatt [10] on the role of the
Baire category theorem in completeness proofs, and his work on deduction systems
for coalgebras [11]. The main difference between his work and ours is that we have
replaced the Countable additivity Rule (CAR) that he uses, with a different infinitary
axiom that has only countably many instances. Goldblatt uses CAR in order to show
countable additivity of the measures that he defines; this is where we have been able to
use of the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma. As far as we know this is a new idea. Furthermore,
Goldblatt’s results are contingent on the assumption that consistent sets can be expanded
to maximally consistent sets; we have essentially proved this fact for our logics.
Regarding the completeness proofs for Markovian logics, the results for probabilis-
tic case were proved by Zhou in [19] and for the general case by Mardare-Cardelli-
Larsen in [15]. In these papers the strong completeness is solved using CAR.
In this paper, we have used some of the results of our earlier paper [13] to show that
we can obtain strong completeness theorems for three types of Markov processes and
their related logics. The main technical lemmas about measure theory are in [13] but the
canonical model constructions which use those facts are in the present paper. That paper
focussed on algebra and duality whereas the present paper is primarily about logic and
can be read independently.
A very tempting future research project is to extend these completeness theorems
to the entire class of systems described as coalgebras of polynomial functors described
by Goldblatt [11]. It is possible that the results of Pattinson and Schro¨der [18] will be
useful for this.
Though the focus of the present paper has been on probabilistic systems and Marko-
vian logics, the techniques may well apply to any non-compact modal logic. We are
investigating whether there is a general way of introducing an infinitary axiom that will
allow us to mimic the techniques of the present paper.
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6 Appendix
Proof (Proof of Lemma 8). 1. This proof can be found in [13], Lemma 17.
2. This result can be proven similarly to the previous case. However, to show that xϕu ∈
R+, we use (R3) that guarantees the existence of a finite upper bound for {r ∈ Q+ |
Lrϕ ∈ u}.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 9). Suppose ϕ, ψ ∈ L and LϕM ∩ LψM = ∅. Then ` ϕ ∧ ψ → ⊥.
We wish to show that
θL(u)(Lϕ ∨ ψM) = θL(u)(LϕM) + θL(u)(LψM).
It suffices to show the inequality in both directions. For ≤, by the definition of θ, it
suffices to show
sup{t | Lt(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ u}
≤ inf{r | ¬Lrϕ ∈ u} + inf{s | ¬Lsψ ∈ u}
= inf{r + s | ¬Lrϕ ∈ u and ¬Lsψ ∈ u}
= inf{r + s | ¬Lrϕ ∧ ¬Lsψ ∈ u};
that is, if Lt(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ u and ¬Lrϕ ∧ ¬Lsψ ∈ u, then t ≤ r + s. But
` ¬Lrϕ ∧ ¬Lsψ↔ ¬Lr((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ) ∧ ¬Ls((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ) and
` ¬Lr((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ) ∧ ¬Ls((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ¬Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ) by (A5),
thus ¬Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ u, and necessarily t ≤ r + s.
The inequality in the opposite direction is similar, using (A4). We need to show
inf{t | ¬Lt(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ u} ≥ sup{r + s | Lrϕ ∧ Lsψ ∈ u};
that is, if ¬Lt(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ u and Lrϕ ∧ Lsψ ∈ u, then t ≥ r + s. But
` Lrϕ ∧ Lsψ↔ Lr((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ) ∧ Ls((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ) and
` Lr((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ) ∧ Ls((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ)→ Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ) by (A4),
thus Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ u implying r + s ≤ t.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 10). To prove that θL is countably subadditive, it is sufficient to
prove that it is continuous from above at ∅, i.e., that if u ∈ UL and Lψ0M ≥ Lψ1M ≥ · · ·
with
⋂
iLψiM = ∅, then
inf
i
θL(u)(LψiM) = 0.
1. We prove this firstly for L(Φ) and L(Π∗).
Consider the countable set F of elements of the form αr = Lt1···tnrϕ for ϕ ∈ L and
rational t1, . . . , tn, r ≥ 0, parameterized by r. If r < s, then ` αs → αr. Using (A4),
θL(u)(Lαr ∧ ¬αsM) ≤ θL(u)(LαrM) − θ(u)(LαsM). (1)
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Since Ltαr ∈ u for all r < s iff Ltαs ∈ u, therefore
θL(u)(LαsM) = inf
r<s
θL(u)(LαrM). (2)
Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small positive number. For each α ∈ F and s ∈ Q0,
choose εsα > 0 such that
∑
α∈F
∑
s∈Q0 ε
s
α = ε. By (1) and (2), we can choose r
s
α < s such
that
θL(u)(Lαrsα ∧ ¬αsM) ≤ θL(u)(LαrsαM) − θL(u)(LαsM) ≤ εsα.
We call a set of formulas of L finitely-consistent if each finite subset of it is con-
sistent. For an arbitrary ψ ∈ L, let LψM∗ be the set maximally-finitely-consistent sets of
formulas that contain ψ.
The assumption
⋂
iLψiM = ∅ implies that ⋂iLψiM* contains no maximally-consistent
set, but only maximally-finitely-consistent sets that are inconsistent (due to (R2)). We
have
UL =
⋂
α∈F
⋂
s∈Q0
⋃
r<s
L¬αrM* ∪ LαsM* . (3)
Thus
⋂
iLψiM = ∅ is equivalent to the condition⋂
α∈F
⋂
s∈Q0
⋃
r<s
L¬αrM* ∪ LαsM*
 ∩⋂
i
LψiM* = ∅.
From this it follows that⋂
α∈F
⋂
s∈Q0
(L¬αrsαM* ∪ LαsM*) ∩⋂
i
LψiM* = ∅.
The set of maximally-finitely-consistent sets form a Stone space (the maximally-
finitely-consistent sets are the ultarfilters of the support boolean algebra), which is a
compact space and LψM* is a clopen for any ψ ∈ L, see [13]. Consequently, there exist
finite sets C0 ⊆ F and S 0 ⊆ Q ∩ [0, 1] and j ∈ N such that⋂
α∈C0
⋂
s∈S 0
L¬αrsα ∨ αsM* ∩ Lψ jM* = ∅,
or in other words,
Lψ jM* ⊆ ⋃
α∈C0
⋃
s∈S 0
Lαrsα ∧ ¬αsM* = L∨
α∈C0
∨
s∈S 0
(αr
s
α ∧ ¬αs) M*
This proves that,
` ψ j →
∨
α∈C0
∨
s∈S 0
(αr
s
α ∧ ¬αs). (4)
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Consequently,
θL(u)(Lψ jM) ≤ θL(u)(L∨
α∈C0
∨
s∈S 0
(αr
s
α ∧ ¬αs)M) ≤ ∑
α∈C0
∑
s∈S 0
θL(u)(Lαrsα ∧ ¬αsM)
≤
∑
α∈C0
∑
s∈S 0
εsα ≤ ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary, infi θL(u)(LψiM) = 0.
2. To prove it for L(∆) we follow the same strategy only that we need to also con-
sider the instances of (R3). We use the same notation.
As for the other case, we consider the countable set F of elements of the form
αr = Lt1···tnrϕ for ϕ ∈ L and rational t1, . . . , tn, r ≥ 0, parameterized by r only that, in
addition we also add the elements α∞ = Lt1···tn⊥. As before, if r < s, then ` αs → αr
and the inequality 1 holds. Similarly, the inequality 2 holds and, in addition, we also
have
θL(u)(Lα∞M) = inf
r∈Q+
θL(u)(LαrM). (5)
Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small positive number. For each α ∈ F and s ∈ Q+∪{∞},
choose εsα > 0 such that
∑
α∈F
∑
s∈Q+∪{∞} εsα = ε. As before, we can choose rsα < s such
that
θL(u)(Lαrsα ∧ ¬αsM) ≤ θL(u)(LαrsαM) − θL(u)(LαsM) ≤ εsα.
and r∞α ∈ Q+ big enough such that
θL(u)(Lαr∞α ∧ ¬α∞M) ≤ θL(u)(Lαr∞α M) − θL(u)(Lα∞M) ≤ ε∞α .
This time we have
UL =
⋂
α∈F
⋂
s∈Q+∪{∞}
⋃
r<s
L¬αrM* ∪ LαsM* . (6)
and following the same rationament as in the previous case we obtain that there exist
finite sets C0 ⊆ F and S 0 ⊆ Q+ ∪ {∞} and j ∈ N such that⋂
α∈C0
⋂
s∈S 0
L¬αrsα ∨ αsM* ∩ Lψ jM* = ∅,
From here we obtain the same conclusion as for case 1, which is
` ψ j →
∨
α∈C0
∨
s∈S 0
(αr
s
α ∧ ¬αs) (7)
implying further
θL(u)(Lψ jM) ≤ θL(u)(L∨
α∈C0
∨
s∈S 0
(αr
s
α ∧ ¬αs)M) ≤ ∑
α∈C0
∑
s∈S 0
θL(u)(Lαrsα ∧ ¬αsM)
≤
∑
α∈C0
∑
s∈S 0
εsα ≤ ε.
